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Competition as a Means of Regulating Insurance
Jason C. Blackford*
T HE SOLE THESIS of this paper is that competition among insurers,
tempered by state supervision of their financial control, is a work-
able alternative to active state control of the business of insurance. It
is not the purpose of this analysis to question the basic concept and the
workability of affirmative government control of insurance. To test this
thesis, a case study will be made of the rating process used in the busi-
ness of automobile liability insurance in the State of Ohio.
I.
Historical Perspective
A historical perspective is necessary in order to understand how
the issue of competition versus active state regulation developed. All
early insurance companies, beginning with the Insurance Company of
North America in 1794,1 were incorporated by special charters granted
by the state legislatures. These charters generally contained some regu-
latory provisions, such as requiring deposits of securities with state of-
ficials, directing how funds should be invested, and requiring a disclosure
of relevant financial information. The fundamental reasons for these
charter requirements were to provide a means for public disclosure of
financial data and to protect the ability of the insurer to meet his obli-
gations.2 Due to the constant financial failures of the early insurance
ventures, the states enacted many general regulatory laws directed at
protecting the solvency of the insurers.3 The thrust of state regulation
remained directed toward the protection of the solvency of the insurer
until the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. South East-
* Of the Ohio Bar; of the law firm of Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Sullivan & Paisley, of
Cleveland.
1 The Insurance Company of North America began doing business in 1792 but was
not incorporated until April 14, 1794, by an act of the Pennsylvania Legislature.
Mowbray & Blanchard, Insurance 452 (4th ed. 1955). It was not until 1898, that
Travelers Insurance Company wrote the first automobile liability policy on the car
of a Buffalo, New York doctor. Crane, Automobile Insurance Rate Regulation, 8
(1962).
2 Kimball, Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory
of Insurance Law, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 471-472 (1961); Oppenheimer, Insurance and the
Anti Trust Laws, 1961 Ins. L. J. 807 at p. 809; Mowbray & Blanchard, supra n. 1, at
452-454.
3 To increase the expertise and the efficiency of state regulation, the responsibility
tended to gradually become centralized in separate board of insurance commission-
ers. The state legislatures began to create and to define the powers of these
specialized boards. New Hampshire 1851-N. H. Laws, Ch. 1111; Massachusetts 1852
-Mass. Acts and Resolves 1852, ch. 231; Vermont 1852-Vt. Laws 1852, No. 45 SS 15,
16; Rhode Island 1855-R.I. Laws 1854 (Oct. Sess.), p. 17 SS 17; New York 1859-
N.Y. Laws 1859, ch. 366.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
COMPETITION TO REGULATE INSURANCE
ern Underwriters' Association (S.E.U.A.).4 Since that decision and the
subsequent legislation, many states have attempted to expand the scope
of their regulation by assuming the control function over policy forms,
trade practices, services rendered to the insured and over-the-market
structure of the industry. The underlying reason for the increased
scope of state regulation has been generally to prevent federal control of
these areas.
To understand this alteration in emphasis, a brief inquiry should
be made into the conflict over the relative roles of the federal and state
governments in the regulation of the business of insurance.
State-Federal Conflict
Prior to U.S. v. S.E.U.A., supra, the courts uniformly had held that
the business of insurance was an intra-state transaction by focusing on
the concept of insurance as a contractual distribution of the risks.5 The
holding of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. S.E.U.A. overruled this long
line of precedent' and stated that insurance was commerce which was
interstate in character, and therefore the insurance industry was sub-
ject to the restrictions of the Sherman Act.7 The majority opinion did
4 322 U.s. 533 (1944); See Sawyer, Insurance as Interstate Commerce, 41-49 (1945);
Beach, The South Eastern Underwriter's Decision and Its Effect, 1947 Wis. L. Rev.
321; Highsaw, Insurance as Interstate Commerce: An Analysis of the Underwriters
Case, 6 La. L. Rev. 24 (1944); Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937
(1944); Note, 44 Colum. L. Rev. 772 (1944).
5 The main and often cited case is Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168 (1858) where an
agent of a non-resident fire insurance company, which had not fulfilled the Virginia
statutory requirements, was charged with a criminal violation of the Virginia insur-
ance code. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that insurance
was interstate commerce and upheld the Virginia State statute as it regulates intra-
state commerce. See also: Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); New York
Life Insurance Company v. Peer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Liverpool In-
surance Company v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566 (1870); Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall.
410 (1870); Philadelphia Fire Association v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Noble v.
Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367 (1896); Orient Insurance Co. v. Doggs, 172 U.S. 389 (1899);
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1901); Nutting v. Massa-
chusetts, 183 U.S. 533 (1902); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). In the above
cases, the insurance companies argue that the business of insurance was inter-
state commerce and therefore not subject to state regulation. See generally Sawyer,
supra note 2 at 33-40.
6 One view states that although these numerous decisions were overruled, the un-
derlying theories were not specifically rejected. Note, 23 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 317 at
319 (1945).
7 In U.S. v. S.E.U.A., supra, n. 4, a majority of four reversed the District Court
which sustained the demurrer of the defendant rating bureau to the indictment
which had alleged (1) a criminal conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce by
fixing and maintaining non competitive premium rates on fire and allied lines of
insurance in six Southern states and; (2) a conspiracy to monopolize the trade and
commerce of fire insurance in the six state area. Mr. Justice Black writing for the
majority held that insurance was commerce, stating "Interrelationships, inter-
dependence, and integration of activities in all states in which they operate are
practical aspects of the insurance companies' method of doing business." At p. 541.
Since the business of insurance was interstate commerce, the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act were applicable.
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not concern itself with the analysis of what should be the proper institu-
tion for regulating the business of insurance or how the industry should
be structured, but merely stated that Congress had plenary power over
the field of insurance.8 This decision not only rocked the insurance in-
dustry to the core but undermined the existing state regulatory struc-
ture which was based on cooperation among insurers. Many of the or-
dinary actions of the state insurance commissioners were considered
overnight to be violations of federal law.9 The insurance companies im-
mediately were faced with the important problem of what to do about
their membership in rating bureaus which were then essential to the
gathering of experience data, but which were not subject to the Sherman
Anti-Trust condemnation of all price fixing agreements.
While U.S. v. S.E.U.A. was pending before the Supreme Court, there
were companion bills 1° introduced into both Houses of Congress to
exempt the business of insurance from federal antitrust legislation.
There were extensive hearings and debate on these bills, but both pro-
posals died in a Senate committee.1 1 After the decision in U.S. v.
S.E.U.A., Congress awakened from its slumber by cries of anguish from
the insurance industry, particularly that the application of the federal
anti-trust laws to the field of insurance would prevent the collection of
accurate 'experience data.
The original version of S. 340,12 which was known as the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, evolved from a proposal prepared by the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners.13 The basic policy of P.L. 15, as
8 "The first part of this argument is buttressed by opinions expressed by various
persons that unrestricted competition in insurance results in financial chaos and
public injury. Whether competition is a good thing for the insurance business is
not for us to consider. Having the power to enact the Sherman Act, Congress did
so; if exceptions are to be written into the Act, they must come from Congress,
not this Court." Id. at 561.
9 Dineen, Gardner, Proctor, The Economics and Principles of Insurance Supervision,
Insurance and Government 10 (1962).
10 On September 20, 1943, s. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., known as the Bailey-Van
Nuys Bill, was introduced. On May 1, 1944, the committee reported on S. 1362
favorably, but on May 15, 1944, the bill was referred back to the Senate Sub-
committee for further study, and there the bill died. On September 21, 1943, H.R.
3269; H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., known as the Walter-Hancock Bill was intro-
duced. On June 22, 1944, the House passed this bill by a vote of 283 to 54. Note
that the passage was after the decision in U.S. v. S.E.U.A. which was handed down
on June 5, 1944.
11 One of the main reasons advanced for the failure of S. 1362 to pass was a survey
conducted by the Department of Justice which revealed that in about half of the
states, which had rating organization, there were insufficient provisions and in-
adequate mechanisms for coping with price fixing conspiracies. See, Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the Joint Committee on
the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 55-57; and Comment, 58 Mich. L. Rev.
730 at 732 (1960).
12 79th Cong., 1st Session (1945).
13 90 Cong. Rec. 8482, 9628, A 4403 (1944). The final bill was also approved by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 91 Cong. Rec. 479 (1945). For an
excellent analysis of the legislative history of P.L. 15 see Comment, 67 Yale L. J. 452
at 454 n. 4 (1958).
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the final bill became known, was to indicate clearly that Congress de-
sired that the business of insurance be subject to state laws and state
taxes. 14 It was not the intention of Congress to clothe the states with
more power to regulate or to tax than the states had prior to the de-
cision in U.S. v. S.E.U.A. 15 The Act instituted a moratorium until Janu-
ary 1, 194810 on the applicability of the federal anti-trust laws to the
business of insurance, and after the moratorium the federal antitrust
laws were to apply to the insurance industry to the extent that it was
not regulated by state law. Congress justified this partial exemption for
the business of insurance from the federal antitrust laws on the grounds
that a certain degree of cooperation among the insurers was necessary
for the gathering of sufficient experience data and effective rate
making.17 The congressional debates on the bill indicate that Congress
primarily was concerned with the allocation of Federal-State responsi-
bility for regulating the business of insurance rather than determining
the proper institution of social control.18
14 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended 15 U.S. (§§ 1011-1015 [1958]).
1) Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several states.
2) (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein shall
be subject to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such insurance business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that after June 30,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the
Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of
September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is regulated by state laws.
3) (a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as
the Sherman Act, and the Act of Oct. 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clay-
ton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, as amended, and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-
Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance
or to acts in conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render until the said Sherman
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
The last two sections are not quoted. See Sen. Rep. No. 1112, 79th Cong.
1st Sess.
15 H.R. Rep. No. 134, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
16 P.L. 238, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) extended the moratorium until July 1, 1948.
17 Sen. Rep., supra n. 14, at 5; Dineen, Gardner and Proctor, supra n. 9, at 35-36.
18 91 Cong. Rec. 1444 (1945) remarks of Senator White and Senator McCarran;
McConnell, State Regulation v. State Regulation Plus Regulation by Multiple De-
centralized Independent Federal Agencies, 1956 Ins. L. J. 697.
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Basis for State Regulation
After the passage of P.L. 15 and the subsequent Supreme Court
decisions in Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin'9 and in Robert-
son v. California,20 the legal basis for continued state regulation was
established firmly. The judicial arm of the government stated its inten-
tion to support state regulation and state taxation until the time when
Congress decided to occupy the area.
The immediate problem that confronted the insurance industry and
the state insurance commissioners was what action had to be taken to
prevent the application of federal laws, particularly the antitrust laws.
The crux of this problem was the proviso 21 that the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act would be appli-
cable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not "regulated" by state law. Two interpretations of the word "regu-
lated" have been championed vigorously: One view is that the passage
of state insurance legislation is all the regulation necessary to satisfy
this proviso; the other view is that the only active and affirmative regu-
lation by state administrative bodies under state statutes would fulfill the
requirements of the proviso.22
19 328 U.S. 408 (1946). In this case, an insurance company domiciled in New Jersey
claimed that the South Carolina tax of 3% on all premiums written in that state by
a foreign insurance company, was an unconstitutional discrimination against inter-
state commerce. The Supreme Court held that P.L. 15 had effectively delegated to
the states the authority to impose such a tax. Mr. Justice Rutledge writing for the
majority declared: "Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the
existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.
This was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be
thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as other-
wise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by
declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation
of this business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage
in it shall be subject to the laws of the several states in these repects." At 429-430.
20 328 U.S. 440 (1946). The Supreme Court rejected the appeal by Robertson from
a conviction for violating a California statute which made it a misdemeanor to act
as an agent for a non-admitted insurer. Robertson had been acting as an agent in
California for an Arizona benefit society which was not licensed in California and
which could not be licensed because it could not meet the California financial
qualifications. The Court upheld the power of California to regulate the business
of insurance conducted in that state and that this power existed independent of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act which had not been enacted at the time of the conviction
of Robertson. Mr. Justice Rutledge in the majority opinion wrote:
"Furthermore, here as in the cited cases, unless one measure of local control is
permissible," the activities and their attendant evils 'must go largely un-
regulated,' unless or until Congress undertakes that function. California v.
Thompson, supra (313 U.S. at p. 115). And in review of the well-known con-
ditions of competition in this field, such a result would not only free out of
state insurance companies and their representatives of the regulations effect,
thus giving them advantages over local competitors, but also by so doing would
tend to break down the system of regulation in its purely local operation."
Note that the opinion makes specific reference to the effect of unrestrained com-
petition on the business of insurance. Compare this to the analysis in U.S. v.
S.E.U.A., 59 Stat. 33 (1945).
21 U.S.C. §§ 1012 (b) (1958).
22 An excellent statement of the two positions is found in Kimbal & Boyce, The
(Continued on next page)
Jan. 1969
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
COMPETITION TO REGULATE INSURANCE
The Congressional debate does not indicate a uniform understand-
ing of the meaning of "regulated." 23 Several Senators expressed a fear
that the states might enact passive legislation which would merely shield
the business of insurance from the Federal anti-trust laws and which
would fail to provide protection from predatory combinations of the type
prohibited by the Federal anti-trust laws.24 Senator McCarran, one of
the sponsors of P.L. 15, in giving the explanation of the bill, confused
the problem by his continual reference to state legislation rather than
state regulation. 25
After the enactment of P.L. 15, several federal officials announced
that the separate states must take an active role in regulating the busi-
ness of insurance in order to avoid application of the federal anti-trust
laws. 20 The states were well aware of the position of the federal gov-
(Continued from preceding page)
Adequacy of State Insurance Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical
Perspective, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 545, at 567. The authors conclude that adequate regu-
lation is necessary to insulate the insurance from the application of the federal anti-
trust laws.
23 Id. at 571-576.
24 91 Cong. Rec. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney), "I do not conceive
this to be a grant of power to the States to authorize by permissive legislation ob-
viously adverse combination which would be against the public interest." Id.
(question by Senator Barkley): "I should like to ask in this connection, whether,
where States attempt to occupy the field-but do it inadequately-by going through
the form of legislation so as to deprive the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, and the
other acts of their jurisdiction, it is the Senator's interpretation of the conference
report that in a case of that kind, where the legislature fails adequately even to deal
with the field it attempts to cover, these acts would apply?" (Answer by Senator
McCarran) "That is my interpretation." 91 Cong. Rec. 1488 (1945) (remarks by
Senator Barkley): "But I wish it to be understood that in voting for approval of
the conference report I am accepting the interpretation placed upon it by the con-
ferees, namely that if any State, through its legislature undertakes to go through
the form of regulation merely in order to put insurance companies within that State
on an island of safety from congressional legislation that effort will be futile and
not only can Congress deal with any phase of the insurance business not dealt with
by a State legislature, but even in the case in which a State legislature deals with
any phase of it, but does not deal with adequately in the opinion of Congress, Con-
gress is not in any way barred by the conference report from dealing with the
subject and with any phase of it which Congress deems to have been inadequately
dealt with by the State; so that thereafter we can enact such legislation as we may
deem proper and wise to have enacted in connection with the regulation of this
business which clearly is interstate commerce."
25 91 Cong. Rec. 1442 (1945) (question by Senator Murdock): "And it is intended
that on the expiration of the moratorium the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act
and the other acts mentioned will again become effective except-" (answer by
Senator McCarran) "Except as far as the States themselves have provided regula-
tions."; 91 Cong. Rec. 1443 (1945) (remarks of Senator McCarran); 91 Cong. Rec.
1481 (1945) (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
26 "After the moratorium period, the anti-trust laws and certain related statutes will
be applicable in full force and effect to the business of insurance except to the
extent that the states have assumed the responsibility, and are effectively perform-
ing that responsibility, for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance busi-
ness may be involved. It is clear that Congress intended no grant of immunity for
monopoly or for boycott, coercion or intimidation. Congress did not intend to per-
mit private rate fixing, which the anti-trust act forbids, but was willing to permit
(Continued on next page)
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ernment when the legislatures approached the problem of "regulating"
the insurance industry.27 The National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners, acting through its Federal Legislative Committee, created
the All Industry Committee which was composed of various representa-
tives of the insurance industry. The All Industry Committee drafted
several model bills2s which were thought to conform to the intent of
Congress and to provide the states with a workable statutory mechanism
for the task of regulating the business of insurance. The State of Ohio,
as well as most other states, adopted the basic structure of many of these
model bills. It is important to note that these model bills were designed
so that competition neither was to be encouraged nor discouraged. 29
The main motivation for the adoption by the states of these model bills
was to avoid the heavy hand of federal regulation and not to determine
whether competition or active state regulation was the appropriate
means for the control of insurance. 30
Interpretation of State Regulation
Faced with the problem of how to interpret the McCarran-Ferguson
Act in specific situations, the courts have failed to adopt a uniform mean-
ing of "state regulation." The Supreme Court in FTC v. National Cas-
ualty Company (FTC v. American Hospital Life Insurance Company) 31
held that mere enactment of legislation by state legislatures, to prohibit
(Continued from preceding page)
actual regulation of rates by affirmative action of states." President Franklin D.
Roosevelt on signing P.L. 15 on March 9, 1945.
".. . the view we hold toward insurance is not unlike our policy toward railroad
rates, that fixing of rates by private groups in either field without active and definite
state approval, is a clear contravention not only of the act, the theory that competi-
tion should be free unless it is specifically regulated by the appropriate body." At-
torney General Biddle, on November 11, 1945 to Drafting Committee of the Council
of State Governments.
27 "Revision of State Systems for Insurance Regulation," Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Insurance Committee of the Council of State Governments (1946).
28 The main model bills that were drafted by the All Industry Committee are:
Model Fire, Marine and Island Marine Rate Regulatory Bill; Model Casualty and
Surety Rate Regulatory Bill; Unfair Trade Practices Bill; Unauthorized Insurers
Service of Process Bill. For a compilation of the states that have enacted various
modifications of the model laws, see Donovan, Regulation of Insurance under the
McCarran Act, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473 at 485 n. 52 (1950); Comment, supra
n. 11, at 735 n. 23. The basic provisions of the Model Casualty and Surety Rate
Regulatory Bill provide: 1. Rates must be adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly
discriminatory, 2. Insurers may combine to fix and file rates or may file their own
rates, but are subject to review by state supervisors to see if the statutory standards
are satisfied, 3. Rating bureaus are permitted but strict safeguards such as licensing
and examination. There is also protection afforded to subscribers and minority
members.
29 Joint Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation and the Committee on
Rates and Rating Organizations of the N.A.I.C. (December 5, 1945) N.A.I.C. Proc. 94.
30 Boyce & Kimball, supra n. 22, at 555; McHugh, Rate Regulation Revisited, in,
Insurance and Government, 385, at 387 (1962).
31 357 U.S. 560 (1948).
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unfair and deceptive advertising by insurance companies, was sufficient
to preclude the FTC from asserting jurisdiction. In a per curiam
opinion, the Court stated:
Petitioner (FTC) also argues in a different vein that even if the
McCarran-Ferguson Act bars federal regulation where state regu-
lation has been effectively applied, the exercise of the Commission's
authority in these cases should be upheld because the States have
not "regulated" within the meaning of Section 2 (b) proviso. This
argument is not persuasive in the instant case. Each state in ques-
tion has enacted prohibitory legislation which prescribes unfair in-
surance advertising and authorizes enforcement through a scheme
of administrative supervision. Petitioner does not argue that the
statutory provisions here under review are merely pretense. Rather
it urges that general prohibition designed to guarantee certain
standards of conduct are too inchoate to be regulation until that
prohibition has been crystallized into "administrative elaboration of
standards and application in individual cases." However, assuming
there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson Act between
"legislation and regulation," nothing in the language of that Act
or its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by the
petitioner. So far as we can determine from the records and argu-
ments in these cases, the proviso in Section 2 (b) has been satis-
fied.32
This was in line with the Court's earlier dicta in Robertson v. Cali-
fornia.33
The lower federal courts generally have refused to delve into ef-
fectiveness of the state regulatory system if applicable legislation was
in existence. In Northern Little Rock Transportation Company v.
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,34 the defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that there was "regulation" under the Ar-
kansas statute. The court granted a summary judgment after noting
the state statutory mechanism for rate filings by rating bureaus. The
mere existence of a legislation governing the premiums charged was
sufficient to preclude the application of the federal anti-trust laws. Simi-
lar holdings were made in California League of Independent Insurance
Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company35 and Miley v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.30
32 Id. at 564-565.
33 Supra, n. 20.
34 181 F.2d 174 (CA-8, 1950). The facts of this case were that the plaintiff, a taxi
cab company, was unable to obtain liability insurance because of poor accident ex-
perience, and applied to the Arkansas Automobile Assigned Risk Plan. Plaintiff
was assigned to Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, which charged the plaintiff
premiums as determined by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, a
licensed rating bureau in Arkansas. Plaintiff filed a private treble damage action
under the Sherman Act claiming that such actions constitute price fixing and were
in restraint of trade.
35 175 F.Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. S.D. 1959).
36 148 F.Supp. 299 (D.C. Mass., 1957) aff'd. 242 F.2d 758, cert. denied 355 U.S.
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The most recent judicial approval of state regulations of insurance
came in a decision of Allstate Insurance Company v. Lanier37 Allstate
challenged the North Carolina law that required all insurers authorized
to do business in that state to be members of a rating bureau. The basic
rate of this bureau was the minimum rate as only upward deviations by
insurers were permitted by state law. The plaintiffs contended that a
private group (the rating bureau, not the state) was setting the in-
surance rates. Judge Sobeloff rejected this contention by stating, that
under North Carolina law, the final authority over premiums was vested
in a state regulatory body. The existence of a state administrative re-
view validated the private price fixing which would have been illegal
under federal law.
The widely publicized decision of United States v. Chicago Tile &
Trust Company38 was the first instance where there was state regula-
tory law and the state law did not displace the federal anti-trust law.
There the government sought to nullify Chicago Title's acquisition of
90% of the stock of Kansas City Title Insurance Company. Govern-
ment attorneys claimed that section 7 of the Clayton Act was violated
as the acquisition eliminated the possibility of competition between
Chicago Title (the nation's second largest title company) and Kansas
City Title (the nation's seventh largest title company). To the defend-
ant's defense of existing state regulation, the government filed a mo-
tion for partial summary judgment stating that the state legislation
must cover the "same ground" as the federal legislation.39 In granting a
partial summary judgment the court refused to accept the defendant's
contention that rate regulation accomplished the same results as the
federal antitrust laws. The only authority for this holding was a
student's note40 and a confusing finding of fact in another federal dis-
trict court.4 1 This District Court decision is an anomaly and should
be confined to the facts in that case. The recent case of Transnational
37 361 F.2d 870 (CA-4, 1966).
38 242 F.Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1965). The final consent decree was filed against
the defendants wherein divestiture of certain acquisitions was ordered. ATTR No.
250, A-18, 4/26/66.
39 In support of its motion, the government attorneys produced the depositions of
three successive Superintendents of Insurance of Missouri which stated that they
knew of no Missouri statute or regulation regulating the acquisition by a foreign
title insurance company of the stock of a domestic title insurer.
40 Note, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 46 Minn.
L. Rev. 1088 (1962).
41 Maryland Casualty Company v. American General Insurance Company, 232
F.Supp. 620 (1964), Finding of Fact No. 2 (Para. 71-188 CCH, 1964 Trade Cases):
"No regulation of the proposed acquisition of control of Maryland Casualty
Company or its agencies under Texas or Maryland statutes can be adequate or
effective because of territorial limitation of Texas and Maryland regulation.
Texas and Maryland statutes do not provide for adequate or effective regulation
of the proposed acquisition of control of Maryland or its agencies and there is
no such regulation as precludes this suit under anti-trust laws."
Jan. 1969
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Insurance Co. v. Rosenland42 is more probably in line with the purpose
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. There the court held that a state statu-
tory framework, though not a verbatim repetition of the federal antitrust
laws, was substantial compliance for the insurance exemption. No in-
quiry was made as to the adequacy of enforcement. As a prerequisite to
evaluating properly the adequacy of state regulations or the application
of antitrust principles to insurance, the nature of insurance must be
thoroughly understood.
II.
Economic Character of Automobile Liability Insurance
It is extremely difficult to have a meaningful analysis of competition
as an institution for social and economic control unless there is an under-
standing of the product and the character of the industry. Automobile
liability insurance is a mechanism by which the risk of loss arising from
claims of those injured and damaged in motor vehicle accidents are dis-
tributed throughout society. The contract of risk distribution, the policy,
is a complex legal document specifically outlining the respective rights
and obligations of the insured and the insurer. Most of these policies are
difficult for the average person to understand and to comprehend.
4 3
The insured must depend in purchasing insurance upon the integrity
of the agent and upon the reputation of the company.
Any analysis of the automobile liability insurance industry must be
made with an understanding of its inherent economic characteristics.
First, there is a relatively low fixed cost of operation for the individual
companies. Approximately eighty per cent of all costs in the industry
are variable, in other words, vary with the value of the policies in
effect.4 4 The main variable costs are losses, claim expenses, state pre-
mium taxes, and commissions to sales agents. This low proportion of
fixed costs to variable costs indicates that economics of scale are
theoretically either minimal or non-existent in any increase in volume
of outstanding policies. There is some debate among the experts as to
whether actually there are economies with an increase in business.
Second, closely related to costs is the relative ease of entry into the
business. The statutory requirements in most states are low and there
is little need for a special technological background as a prerequisite to
entry. The necessary rating experience for rate preparation can be ob-
tained from one of several organizations. The main barrier to entry of
new companies involves the access of the insurer to the individual con-
42 261 F.Supp. 12 (D.C. Ore., 1966).
43 There has been a trend among certain "independent" insurers to simplify the
policy into terms which are understandable by the public.
44 Crane, supra, n. 1, pp. 18-19.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss1/11
18 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
sumer. An effective sales organization cannot be created overnight but
must be developed by gaining the confidence of the public and hiring
top-flight agents.
Of critical importance from the regulatory standpoint is the struc-
ture of a market model for the industry. The model is characterized
by a highly inelastic demand curve and an elastic supply curve. This
inelastic demand curve arises from the fact that there is no substitute
for insurance, particularly because of the compulsory insurance laws of
some states. The inelastic character of the demand curve is demon-
strated by the constant volume of auto liability insurance written during
the depression years of 1929 to 1933.45 The supply curve of the auto-
mobile liability insurance business is considered elastic as any increase
in the demand for insurance generates but a minor price increase. Any
substantial increase in demand (from an increase in the driving popu-
lation) shifts the entire supply curve to the right as the capacity of the
industry may be increased by either the entry of additional insurers or
the expansion of additional insurers. This theoretical analysis is com-
plicated by the consumers' impressions of the rates charged by the var-
ious insurers. Several consumer surveys have shown that a substantial
number but a decreasing percentage of automobile policy holders believe
that all companies charge the same premium for the same coverage. A
comprehensive survey conducted in 1956 by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters indicated that 43% of those interviewed thought
that all automobile insurers have the same rates. The consensus in
other surveys indicates that automobile policy holders consider the
premium more important than other factors in purchasing insurance
coverage. The National Bureau study found that approximately seventy
per cent of the policyholders of rate bureau companies believed that
they were obtaining the lowest possible rates. These results can be in-
terpreted to mean that good salesmanship on the part of the agents of
the bureau companies has shifted the attention of the public to the non-
price competition. This means also that the rate bureau companies are
vulnerable to "discount" price advertising of the direct writers or bu-
reau companies which have filed lower rate deviation.46
To summarize, the economic characteristics of the business of auto-
mobile liability insurance are:
1. The product being sold is risk distribution.
2. The product is in the form of a complex legal document not fully
understood by the public. The public is dependent upon the in-
telligence of the agents.
45 Best's Fire and Casualty Aggregates and Averages (Alfred M. Best Co., 1960)
p. 21.
46 Crane, supra, n. 1, p. 49.
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3. The demand for automobile liability is growing due to the in-
creased number of drivers. The demand for such insurance is
relatively inelastic to price changes due to lack of a substitute.
4. The consumer claims to be interested in the premium rate but
he is relatively uninformed as to rate structure throughout the
industry. This has led to vigorous non-price competition in such
fields as (a) coverage, (b) advertising, and (c) service.
III.
Objectives of Social Control
Before an evaluation can be made of the institutions for social con-
trol, the objectives for social control of the industry must be outlined.
The equalization of the cost of a loss by a distribution of risks is
achieved primarily through private means but regulated by state ad-
ministrative agencies. The increasing demand that all automobiles and
all automobile drivers should be insured is gradually altering this basic
focus of automobile insurance from a controlled private socialization of
the risk to a public enterprise. The objectives of rate making under
the private system of distribution of risks may be separated into two
general categories-solvency and reasonableness.
47
Solvency
Solvency is the financial ability of an insurer to meet not only its
current obligations but also satisfy any future claims under existing
policies.
The role of capital in the solvency of a going insurance company
is relatively minor because the business operates on a risk distribution
basis; however in the early days of any insurance company, capital
plays a vital role until the "law of large numbers" permits the insurer
to function with safety as a risk distributor.45 The key to a determina-
tion of an "adequate" rate is an accurate estimate of future liabilities
with respect to the present coverage. This means that adequate rates
for one insurer might not be the same for another insurer if there is a
different risk of loss covered. 49
47 Kimball, supra, n. 2, at 486. Professor Kimball, one of the foremost authorities
in the field of insurance regulation, used the term, "reasonable" in a far broader
sense in his analysis than the term is used in this paper. Professor Kimball stated
that: "The objective of acquum et bonum is present in some degree in most systems
of insurance law and regulation. It has many facets: It is equity. It is morality. It
is fairness, equality, reasonableness. It may even be efficiency, economy, parsimony."
48 Id.
49 In the field of transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the fed-
eral courts have held that a "reasonable" rate was not dependent on the rate of
return. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Iowa v. Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany, 20 I.C.C. 181 (1911); Hooker v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 188 F.2d
242 (1911), reversed on other grounds 225 U.S. 302 (1912). In both of these cases,
the courts assumed a competitive situation in reaching their determination.
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Reasonableness
The nebulous term, "reasonableness," in relation to automobile li-
ability insurance rates primarily means that the rates to the insured
should not be "excessive" and that there should be a fair classification
of the risks. The reason for the policy against "excessive" rates is that
since insurance is essentially a risk distribution process, others than the
risk takers should not reap inordinate profits from the rates. It is ex-
tremely difficult to define the word "excessive." One rather circular
approach is to determine what is a "reasonable rate of return" for the
owners of the company. Most statutory definitions have attempted to
measure "excessiveness" by subjective standards.50 It has been left
to the discretion of the insurance commissioner of the various states to
interpret "excessive." The result has been that the meaning of "ex-
cessive" has varied according to the views and backgrounds of the in-
surance commissioners and according to the tradition and precedents
of his office.5 1
The concept of fairness is that the policyholders should be classi-
fied in valid categories5 2 so that each insured will carry the cost of his
own insurance. 5 3 This requires an accurate refinement of the risk cal-
culations as balanced against the cost of the classification.
50 Cal. Ins. Code, Art. 2 § 1852(a) (1947) "No rate shall be held to be excessive
unless (1) such rate is unreasonably high for the insurance provided, and (2) a
reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area which the rate is
applicable."
The definition of "inadequate" under California law also refers to the institution
of competition for meaning. Cal. Ins. Code Act § 1852(a) (1947): "No rate shall be
held to be inadequate unless (1) such rate is unreasonably low for the insurance
provided and (2) the continued use of such rate endangers the solvency of the
insurer using the same, or unless (3) such rate is unreasonably low for the insur-
ance provided and the use of such rate by the insurer using same has, or if con-
tinued will have, the effect of destroying competition or creating a monopoly."
Ohio, which has no statutory definition of excessive, has a court developed law
that a policyholder may recover from the insurer "excessive" premiums if the rates
bear no relationship to the risk insured against. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v.
Douds, 103 Ohio St. 398 (1921), affirmed 261 U.S. 476 (1923); Hartford Life Insurance
Co. v. Langdale, 103 Ohio St. 433 (1921), affirmed 261 U.S. 476 (1923). There have
been no cases in Ohio involving this principle under Ohio law. See 30 Ohio Jur.2d
§§ 394-397, at 366-7.
51 Onfield, Improving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 219 at 244
(1948).
52 Most states prohibit insurance companies from making any distinction or dis-
crimination on the basis of race or color as to rates charged. Ohio has such a pro-
vision only with regard to life insurance companies. Ohio R.C. § 3911.16 (1953).
There is in Ohio an informal racial discrimination process on the agent level in the
field of automobile liability insurance. This is extremely difficult to prove and to
ascertain to what degree there is such discrimination.
53 For example, most automobile insurance companies have a special category for
insureds under the age of twenty-five. Is there any specific reason for this arbi-
trary use of the age 25? One writer has observed: "The discovery and validation
of the appropriate categories which reach to the heart of the risk variation is a
difficult matter especially since the search gets so easily in unrealized biases of the
rate makers." Kimball, supra, n. 2 at 496. Consider also the special automobile
(Continued on next page)
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Other competing and often conflicting objectives of rate regulation
that should be recognized are: (1) The ability of rates to be responsive
to risk conditions; (2) the need for stability in the rate structure in order




Institutions of Social Control
The next step in this analysis is to evaluate the institutions as to
their capability of attaining and of encouraging the attainment of the
objectives of insurance. Under the present social and economic system,
there are two primary means by which the business of insurance is
regulated: (1) Government control or supervision; (2) Competition
supplemented by a limited amount of government supervision. Neither
of these two primary alternatives are absolute but rather are hybridiza-
tions of the two institutions of private competition and government con-
trol or supervision.
As stated at the outset, the purpose of this paper is not an attempt
to compare or to evaluate the relative merits of active government regu-
lations and of private competition, but to demonstrate that a system
based on competition provides a workable framework for the social con-
trol of the business of insurance. So let us examine the arguments ad-
vanced by the opponents of an insurance industry based on competition.
Arguments Against Competition
There are many within the insurance business and several academi-
cians who believe that competition cannot be a workable means of
achieving the objectives of insurance because of the basic nature of the
competitive system. The main argument of these critics of competi-
tion is that premium rate competition among insurers tends to become
destructive with a resulting impairment of the financial structure of the
entire business of insurance. To substantiate their argument, they point
to instances in the last century where rate competition among insurers
supposedly was responsible for the financial collapse of many companies
with resulting loss to many policyholders.5 5 In the alternative, these
(Continued from preceding page)
liability insurance policies for "clear risks." As a public policy should the accident-
prone driver be forced off the highways unless that driver pays an extremely high
"toll" in the form of insurance rates?
54 Kupp, The Rate Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals,
Techniques and Limits, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 493 at 494-495 (1950).
55 To the knowledge of this writer, there has never been a study conducted of the
actual causes of the widespread failures in the insurance industry during the last
century. It is possible that these failures could be attributed to other factors such
as poor management, inaccurate estimation of liabilities or poor investments.
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critics of competition reason further that since destructive competition
or the threat of destructive competition is intolerable to the competitors,
the insurers will cease to compete, and will seek the shelter of coopera-
tion. In this collective hive, a monopoly would take root and seek to use
its economic power to foist excessive rates upon the powerless public and
to punish any recalcitrant insurer who would dare to attempt to disturb
their profits. 50
Another argument advanced against competition in the business of
insurance is that competition by its nature encourages a greater fluctua-
tion of rates which would lead to a misallocation of the economic cost
of insurance. In other words, the fluctuation in rates due to market
pressure would force the purchasers of insurance protection to pay
different sums to the same insurer for the distribution of the same
risk.57
Another fear expressed by these critics of competition is that a
competitive situation might permit the stronger insurance companies to
use their larger financial and organizational resources to obtain a larger
percentage of the market and to force smaller and marginal insurers out
of business.5s This would erect not only barriers to entry, but would
weaken the protection afforded by the smaller insurance companies to
their policyholders.
A final argument advanced by these foes of insurance competition
is that competition would breed a multitude of policies which tend to
confuse the public. In more practical terms they state there is the pos-
sibility that the policy language, created by one insurer after much effort
and work, would be appropriated by another insurer and altered to give
the secondary insurer several "talking points" in favor of its form.59
After this enumeration of these theoretical evils of competition in
the business of insurance, the next step of the analysis is to study the
effects of competition in a practical setting in order to ascertain whether
these predicted calamities come to pass.
Method of Analysis
To study the effects of competition as a means of regulating the
rates of automobile liability insurers, an examination of the rating
process of such insurers in Ohio will be made. Ohio was selected be-
56 This assumes the present legal structure where the federal antitrust laws would
not be applicable.
57 This argument overlooks the fact that the insurer in fluctuating the rate is only
changing his rate of return. The basic cost of distributing the risk remains the
same, although the total cost to the consumer may vary. This argument depends
on a specific definition of cost.
58 Donovan, Rate Regulation Revisited, Insurance and Government, 291, at 314
(1962).
59 Marryott, Twelve Years of Insurance as Commerce-Prospects for the Future,
1957 Ins. Counsel J. 191 at 193.
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cause of the "file and use" law which permits insurers to change their
rates in Ohio by filing new schedules with the Ohio Department of In-
surance. This type of regulatory process is the type that will permit
rate competition to exist. First, an examination must be made of the po-
tential competitive forces and the operation of the rating process. Then
an evaluation must be made as to whether competition does in fact exist.
Ohio Rating Forces
In Ohio, there are four major groups involved in automobile liability
rating process. First is the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
a nationwide rating organization of stock insurance companies. Through-
out the country, the National Bureau accounts for rate filings on ap-
proximately half of all automobile liability insurance premiums. It is
comprised of several hundred members throughout the country whose
premium constitute about eighty per cent of the organization's total
volume. There are also numerous subscribers who utilize the rates filed
by the National Bureau and are entitled to the other services of the or-
ganization. Effective January 2, 1968, there was a consolidation of the
National Bureau and the National Automobile Underwriters Association
into the Insurare Rating Board, which will have approximately 125
members and subscribers operating in Ohio.
The second nationwide rating organization is The Mutual Insurance
Rating Bureau composed of non-stock or mutual insurers. The Mutual
Bureau operates in 42 states and has approximately fifty members and
fifty subscribers. While the National Bureau and the Mutual Bureau
do not cooperate formally in establishing rates, the Mutual Bureau
adds the experience data of the National Bureau to its own data in the
computation of rates. The National Bureau utilizes its own experience
in the computation of its rates.
The third rating organization, which operates only in Ohio, is the
Ohio Bureau of Casualty Insurers which has 28 members and sub-
scribers.6 The Ohio Bureau does not restrict its experience data just to
its own members and subscribers although its members include some
of the largest automobile liability insurers in the state. The Ohio Bu-
reau pursues an independent course from the other two rating bureaus.
The fourth force among Ohio automobile liability insurers is the
"independents" or the companies that are not affiliated with any of
the rating organizations. Although classified as "independents," most of
these insurers are either members or subscribers to the National As-
sociation of Independent Insurers (NAII). It is not a rating bureau as
the insurers affiliated with the association make and file their own rates
60 Letter from John C. Winchell, Secretary-Manager of Ohio Bureau of Casualty
Insurers to author dated August 23, 1966.
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independently. Nineteen of the NAII's members are domiciled in Ohio
and over 150 other members do business in Ohio.' 1 Two of the largest
automobile liability insurers in Ohio are NAII members-Nationwide
and Allstate. These independents do not appear to operate with unity
of purpose, rather each company pursues its own goals and selects its
own rates. The degree of cooperation and the operation of these rating
organizations is regulated by the Ohio Revised Code.
Ohio Statutory Regulation of Rating Bureaus
The Ohio statute requires that all rating bureaus operating in Ohio
must obtain a license. 62 The superintendent of insurance must grant a
license when the applicant is:
competent, trustworthy, and otherwise qualified to act as a rating
bureau and that its constitution, its articles of agreement or as-
sociation or certificate of incorporation, and its bylaws, rules and
regulations governing the conduct of its business conform to the
law.
6 3
If any insurer's application to become a subscriber in a rating organiza-
tion is not granted or rejected by the bureau, the applicant may request
a review by the Ohio superintendent of insurance. If the superintendent
finds that the denial of an application was without "justification," the
rating bureau will be required by the superintendent of- insurance to
admit that insurer as a subscriber. 4 The rating bureau is required not to
discriminate in furnishing its services to members or subscribers.65
Investigation has failed to reveal a reported instance of a bureau's re-
fusal to grant an Ohio automobile insurer membership to an applicant
or of a bureau's discrimination in furnishing services to Ohio members
and subscribers.
As to the degree of cooperation among the rating organizations, all
cooperative activity is subject to the supervision of the Superintendent
of Insurance. Either upon a complaint or upon his own initiative, the
Superintendent may order hearings on the alleged illegal cooperation. If
it is determined after a hearing that the cooperative activity is "unfair,
unreasonable, or otherwise inconsistent" with the provisions of the in-
surance code, a written order may be issued directing the discontinuance
of the cooperation. 0 To date, the cooperative actions of the insurers in
sharing experience data has not been challenged by the Ohio Department
of Insurance.
61 Letter from Charles J. Lorenz, of the National Association of Independent In-
surers to author dated September 12, 1966.
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Criteria for Reviewing Rates
In addition to regulating the degree of cooperation among rating
organizations and insurers, the main task of the Ohio Department of
Insurance is to review rates submitted by the bureaus and by individual
insurers. The statute outlines in detail the elements which are to be con-
sidered in the formulation of casualty rates. Section 3937.02 of the Ohio
Revised Code states that:
All casualty rates shall be made in accordance with the following:
(A) Due consideration shall be given to:
(1) Past and prospective loss experience within and outside
this state;
(2) The experience or judgment, or both, of the insurer or
rating organization making the rate;
(3) The experience of other insurers or rating organizations;
(4) Physical hazards;
(5) Catastrophe hazards;
(6) A reasonable margin for underwriting profit and con-
tingencies;
(7) Dividends, savings, or unabsorbed premiums, deposits al-
lowed or returned by insurers to their policyholders, members, or
subscribers;
(8) Past and prospective expenses both countrywide and those
specially applicable to this state;
(9) All other relevant factors within and outside this state.
It must be re-emphasized that the Superintendent of Insurance does not
set premiums but merely approves on the basis of the above criteria the
rates submitted by the rating bureaus and the insurance companies. It
is the responsibility of the insurers to formulate their own premium
rates for submission to the Superintendent of Insurance.
Method of Calculating Rates
The method of calculation of automobile liability rates is generally
uniform among the rating organizations and the insurers who file in-
dependently or who file rates that deviate from the rates submitted by
their rating organization. First, a system of classifying the risks is de-
veloped. This is done by a careful evaluation of the experience data.
Categories are devised on the basis of geographical area, age of the
driver, use, mileage and other hazards. 7 Once the classification is de-
termined, the dollar value of the loss exposure is calculated. Then, the
insurer allocates to each classification the applicable expense and the
67 A complete outline of the system used by the National Bureau is National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters, Manual of Automobile Insurance Rules and Rates-Ohio(1966).
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profit requirements.6 8 The insurers then utilize the "pure premium"
method in determining the final rate. In its simplest terms, the pure
premium method involves ascertaining the dollar-and-cents cost for
losses per unit of exposure, through a review of experience data, and
then adding to the proposed pure premium, the expenses, underwriting
profit and reserves for contingencies.( 9 It should be re-emphasized that
this entire process is dependent upon an accurate and wide collection
of experience data.
Filing Procedure
The party filing the rate is not required to submit supporting data
unless the Superintendent does not possess "sufficient" information.70
In major rate changes, a vast quantity of actuarial data accompanies the
filing. For the minor filings, such as small classification and rate altera-
tions, a minimum of substantiating evidence is presented. The rating
organizations or the actuarial department of individual insurers prepare
this supporting material.
Once filed, the rate becomes effective automatically after fifteen days;
although the superintendent may extend this period an additional fifteen
days.7 1 At any time after filing, the superintendent has the authority
to hold a hearing on whether the rate complies with the standards of
68 Ohio R.C. § 3937.02. (B) The system of expense provisions included in the rates
for use by any insurer or group of insurers may differ from those of insurers of
groups of other insurers to reflect the requirements of the operating methods of any
such insurer or group with respect to any kind of insurance, or with respect to any
subdivision or combination thereof for which separate expense provisions are
applicable.(C) Risks may be groups by classifications for the establishment of rates and
minimum premiums. Classification rates may be modified to produce rates for
individual risks in accordance with rating plans which establish standards for
measuring variation in hazard or expense provisions, or both. Such standards may
measure any difference among risks that can be demonstrated to have probable
effect on losses or expenses.
Classifications or modifications of classifications, or any portion or division
thereof, of risks may be predicated upon size, expense, management, individual ex-perience, purpose of insurance, location or dispersion of hazard, or any other
reasonable considerations, providing such classifications and modifications apply to
all risks under the same or substantially the same circumstances or conditions.
Classification rates may also be modified to produce rates for individual or special
risks which are not susceptible to measurement by any established standards.
69 "Suppose for example, that the pure premium from a review of the experience
is $1.50, and the expense provision (including the profit factor) is forty per cent;
then the final rate would be $1.50 ($1.50 divided by 1.00- .40) or $2.50. Then 60
per cent of this rate, or $1.50, is for losses, and the remaining 40 per cent, or $1.00
is the expense provision." Michelbacher, Multiple Life Insurance 84 (1957); an ex-
cellent analysis is found in Zoffer, The History of Automobile Liability Insurance
Rating (1959). See generally, Stern, Current Rate Making Procedures for Auto-
mobile Liability Insurance (Casualty Actuarial Society 1961).
70 See Ohio R.C. § 3937.02 (A) (1953).
71 Ohio R.C. § 3235.04. There is also a provision which permits the superintendent
to authorize a filing which has been reviewed to become effective before the end of
waiting period or any extension of the waiting period.
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the law. If the standards of the statutes are not satisfied, then the
Superintendent can issue an order rendering the rate ineffective after a
reasonable period of time. The standard by which the Superintendent
is to analyze the proposed rate is contained in Ohio Revised Code, Sec-
tion 3937.02 (D) which states that, "Rates shall not be excessive, in-
adequate or unfairly discriminatory," nor have the Ohio courts had the
opportunity to render an interpretation of these words. The Insurance
Department also has failed to give any public clarification of the exact
meaning of these statutory requirements. In recent years there have
been several formal hearings on the rates filed by insurers. One of the
more recent hearings concerned the proposed automobile rate of All-
state Insurance Co. and whether the rates were excessive in light of the
profits earned by the company in the preceding years. 72 Another well
publicized hearing was on the rates proposed by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and National Automobile Underwriters Associa-
tion.73
The Department of Insurance, in lieu of the formal proceedings, has
adopted an informal screening device of refusing to accept the filing or
indicating in advance that the proposed filing would be rejected. This
informal proceeding has been invoked only a "few" times when the rate
filing was so inadequate as to endanger the solvency of the insurer.74
This informal procedure has reduced the financial and resource bur-
den on the department which a statutory hearing would entail.
After the rate has become effective, the filing and any supporting in-
formation are subject to public inspection. After the effective date of the
rate, any person who is "aggrieved" by the filing may file an applica-
tion for a hearing. Note that this standard of private parties differs from
that given by statute to the Superintendent (i.e., "excessive, inadequate,
or unfairly discriminatory").
These procedural requirements apply to all companies engaged in
the business of insurance in Ohio. An insurer may satisfy these filing
requirements by being a member or a subscriber in a licensed rating
bureau which makes the rate filings. The member or subscriber must
submit to the superintendent a written authorization to accept any rates
filed by the bureau on its behalf.7 5 Every member and subscriber of a
licensed rating organization must adhere to the rate made on its behalf
72 The Allstate rates amounted a 7% increase on automobile liability rates and a
4% increase on collision rates. William Morris, the Ohio Superintendent of Insur-
ance, noted that Allstate had made a 6.7% underwriting profit in 1966.
73 The rates were proposed on November 30, 1966 and in response to a complaint
by the AFL-CIO, a hearing was held on February 14, 1967 through February 16,
1967. The proposed rates were for companies comprising 16.9% of the automobile
liability insurance volume. The proposed rates were accepted.
74 This information was obtained through conversations and interviews with various
members of the insurance business and with certain state officials.
75 Ohio R.C. § 3935.04(B).
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by the bureau; however, any member or subscriber may make a written
application for a uniform percentage deviation from any rates proposed
by the bureau.7 6 If the deviations are approved by the superintendent,
then the deviation rates will become effective for one year.
Deviations
This deviation process could be easily adopted to placing substantial
roadblocks in the paths of deviators or potential deviators. 77 First, the
rating bureau could subject the deviator to a long and costly hearing
when the application for deviation is first filed. Second, even if the rating
bureau does not protest the deviation rate, the superintendent could
demand a vast array of supporting data and statistics, which could stall
the matter for many months. Finally, the standards by which the super-
intendent is to evaluate the deviation rate are far from clear.78 The
exact number of deviation rate filings in Ohio is not readily available but
informed sources say that there are a substantial number of deviation
rate filings each year. 79 Investigation has failed to reveal any instance
where a rating organization has attempted to harass a deviator by means
of filing a protest and insisting on a formal hearing.
In summary, the policy of the Superintendent of Insurances ° and the
rating section of the Department of Insurance has been to permit the
rates for automobile liability insurance. What have been the results of
regulating insurance in Ohio by permitting competition?
76 Ohio R.C. § 3935.07 which states in part: Such application shall specify the basis
for the modification and a copy thereof shall be sent simultaneously to such rating
bureau. The superintendent shall set a time and place for a hearing at which the
insurer and such rating bureau may be heard, and shall give them not less than
ten days' written notice thereof. If the superintendent is advised by the rating
bureau that it does not desire a hearing, he may, upon the consent of the applicant,
waive such hearing .... The superintendent shall issue an order permitting the
deviation for such insurer to be filed if he finds it justified, and it shall thereupon
become effective. He shall issue an order denying such application if he finds that
the resulting premiums would be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.
.. (Emphasis added.) See also, 30 Ohio Jur.2d § 55, p. 89.
77 Dirlam and Stelzer, Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of
Regulated Competition, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 199 (1958); Stone, Rate Regulation v.
Rate Making, 1955 Ins. L. J. 107.
78 ,,... the policy of the Ohio insurance department. In determining whether or
not a rate deviation is justified, the Ohio department recognizes loss experience in
the following order of importance: (1) Ohio loss experience of the insurer; (2) Ohio
loss experience of other insurers or rating bureaus; and (3) Loss experience of
the insurer or other insurers or rating bureaus outside the State. Thus the primary
importance is attached to the experience of the particular insurance company in
filing the new rate. In addition it is significant to note that the regulations of the
Ohio Department of Insurance contain specific sections informing the insurance
companies of the procedures to follow in filing deviations as to rules, coverage and
form." Ohio Department of Insurance Rating Section General Bulletin No. 26, Filing
Requirements-Rates, Rules and Coverage, § II (Jan. 17, 1958).
79 This was confirmed by an examination, which was made of the Department of
Insurance Newsletters for the past six years.
80 Ninety-Eighth Annual Report of the Director of Insurance 1965. Statement of
William R. Morris, p. 1.
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V.
Analysis
Concentration in Ohio Liability Insurance
The next inquiry must be whether the market for automobile li-
ability insurance in Ohio is competitive and whether this competition
does accomplish the goals of rate regulation-solvency and reasonable-
ness. The question of whether a given market is competitive is a matter
of definition and degree. One of the key guidelines to determining the
degree of competition is the absence of a monopoly power by one or more
firms.
Table I presents the nine major automobile liability insurers in
Ohio in the period of 1962-1965. This four-year period was selected
since all financial data of the companies for these years is available to
the public. During the 1962-1965 period there were over 450 insurers
in Ohio which were authorized to sell automobile liability insurance.
TABLE I
Premiums of Automobile Liability Insurance











Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Allstate Insurance Company
Buckeye Union Insurance Company
Grange Mutual Casualty Company
Motorist Mutual Insurance Company
Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company
State Auto Mutual Insurance
Company




















Total of All Insurers in Ohio $136,369,654
1963
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company $ 4,478,406
Allstate Insurance Company 9,347,284
Buckeye Union Insurance Company 7,888,994
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TOTAL PREMIUMS
Company
Motorist Mutual Insurance Company
Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company
State Auto Mutual Insurance
Company















Total of All Insurers in Ohio $144,010,786
1964
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Allstate Insurance Company
Buckeye Union Insurance Company
Grange Mutual Casualty Company
Motorist Mutual Insurance Company
Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company
State Auto Mutual Insurance
Company




















Total of All Insurers in Ohio $166,045,504
1965
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Allstate Insurance Company
Buckeye Union Insurance Company
Grange Mutual Casualty Company
Motorist Mutual Insurance Company
Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company
State Auto Mutual Insurance
Companyo




















Total of all Insurers in Ohio $166,045,504
Source: Reports of the Superintendent of Insurance For the
Years 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
The largest insurer in the state did only 12.466 per cent of the total auto-
mobile liability insurance business and this percentage declined over the
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greater rate of growth than did Nationwide. Next, note that there was
a change in the relative ranking of eight of the nine major insurers. It
is evident from these statistics that no company is a monopoly as de-
fined by the Sherman Antitrust Law, s1 absent any predatory practices.
From an economic viewpoint, this market is relatively fragmented in
relation to such industries as steel, autos, copper and computers.
Adjustments
Next, the rates of automobile liability insurance must be analyzed
in relation to the increased number of vehicles and the inflation that
has characterized this industry. An industry-wide approach is under-
taken since company-by-company analysis would produce a distortion,
because of the degree of coverage afforded by different policies and be-
cause the rate changes of many companies occur at different times. Table
II shows the increase of motor vehicles registered in Ohio.
TABLE II
Motor Vehicles Registered in Ohio
(Excluding Government-Owned Vehicles)
No. of Total Increase Annual Increase
Year Vehicles (1962 = 100) Per Cent
1962 3,832,475 100 -0-
1963 3,982,192 103.906 3.906
1964 4,169,057 108.782 4.876
1965 4,404,095 114.915 6.133
1966 4,681,183 122.145 7.230
1967 4,840,000 (Est.) 126.289 4.144
Source: U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, as reported in Auto-
mobile Facts & Figures published by Automobile Manu-
facturers Association, Inc. for the Years 1963 through
1968.
81 The three tests of monopolization were summarized by Judge Wyzanski in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, at 342 (D.C. Mass., 1953),
aff'd. per curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954): (1) if the firm has acquired or maintained a
power to exclude others as a result of an unreasonable restraint of trade; (2) if the
firm has the power to exclude competition and has either exercised or has the pur-
pose to exercise such power; (3) if the firm has an overwhelming show of the
market and if this market share is not due to superior skill, products or other
natural advantages. In that case the defendant had approximately 85% of the
market.
Although it has been said that bigness is not per se illegal, 90% "is enough to
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether 60 or 64% would be enough; and cer-
tainly thirty-three per cent is not." United States v. Aluminum Company of
America, 148 F.2d 416, at 424 (CA-2, 1945).
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TABLE III
Adjustment for Inflation








Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1968 Table A-64.
When these two adjustments are applied to the total premium volume of
automobile liability insurance, there should be an absolute premium per
registered vehicle in Ohio.
TABLE IV
Total Premium Premium Dollar
For Automobile Total Vehicles Per Vehicle ConsumerLiability Registered (Total Premium) PriceYear Insurance In Ohio (Total Vehicles) Index Adjusted
1962 $136,369,654 3,832,475 $35.58 105.4 33.761963 144,010,786 3,982,192 36.16 106.7 33.891964 152,969,197 4,169,057 36.69 108.1 33.941965 166,045,504 4,681,183 35.47 109.9 32.27
It appears from these figures that the premium dollar per registered ve-
hicle has remained approximately constant in 1962 through 1964 and de-
creased in 1965. One important assumption of this approach must be
stated. This analysis has assumed that the percentage of uninsured ve-
hicles has remained constant throughout this period. At this moment the
writer has no statistical information to show that the number of unin-
sured motorists have increased. Furthermore, the uninsured vehicle
should be accounted for by the premium charged for the uninsured
motorist coverage which would be reflected in the total premium volume.
In spite of the imperfections of this analysis, it refutes the generally ac-
cepted notion that insurance rates are always advancing. No effort is at-
tempted herein to state categorically that real premiums for automobile
rates did not rise in that four-year period. These statistics do permit
the conclusion that the real price to the consumer is "reasonable" con-
sidering the increasing automobile congestion and the inflation.
One further point must be emphasized. During this four-year period,
not one of the insurers domiciled in Ohio was declared insolvent or
placed in any type of court receivership. It would appear that there is
adequate protection in Ohio from insurer insolvency.
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In summary, the policies of the Rating Section of the Ohio Depart-
ment of Insurance have permitted the rates for automobile liability in-
surance to be set by competition among the insurers. The motives be-
hind these policies is unclear. There are four reasons which could ex-
plain the attitude of this regulatory agency: (1) A deep philosophical
belief that the less government interference the better; (2) an outright
default of their regulatory responsibility; (3) the pressure of the in-
dustry forced abdication from their position as regulatory; and (4) the
belief that competition is the best institution for supplementing the De-
partment's supervisory approach to regulation. 2 Regardless of the mo-
tives, it is the results that are important to the central question of this
paper.
Summary of Analytical Findings
Has the Ohio experience with competition substantiated the dire
predictions made by the critics of the application of competition to in-
surance? First, the predicted destructive rate competition has not de-
veloped as evidenced by the fact that not one Ohio company writing
automobile liability insurance under the present statutory structure
has been forced into bankruptcy or reorganization.8 3 It is uncertain
whether this excellent record of financial solvency is due to the actions
taken as a result of the close scrutiny by the Department of Insurance
of the required quarterly financial reports or because of the self-interest
of the insurer. Second, it is very difficult to ascertain whether the rates
under competition have been excessive because of the necessity of
evaluating the many variables of rate calculation. Normally, excessive
rates can be charged only when there is a concentration of economic
power or when there is an informal or formal agreement among com-
petitors not to compete.84 The lack of concentration among the writers
of automobile liability insurance in Ohio has been mentioned previously.
The rating bureaus' lack of economic power over rates is due primarily
to the existence of several aggressive independent insurers. This would
seem to indicate that the more competition, the less likely that concen-
tration within the industry would develop.8 5 Furthermore, there is little
82 It is this writer's opinion that the last two reasons together are responsible for
the existence of competition in Ohio. There is no evidence that can be introduced to
substantiate this hypothesis except a general "feeling" that was generated by the
various interviews with members of the insurance business and state officials.
83 This information was obtained through conversations with various members of
the insurance industry and with certain state officials.
84 The phrase "informal or formal agreements among competitors not to compete"
is meant to include all types of price fixing conspiracies, price leadership, and
collusion.
85 The Ohio Department of Insurance assumes that competition will continue in the
business of insurance as long as there is no concentration in the industry. The Ohio
Department of Insurance also assumes that competition will in itself prevent ex-
cessive rates. See also Boyce & Kimball, supra, n. 22, at 2.
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evidence of any agreement not to compete or to fix prices. The reason
for the strength of the larger independent insurers in Ohio is probably
due to their aggressive marketing including the development of selec-
tive risk programs and greater flexibility in tailoring problems to satisfy
the needs of the public. The use of the new selected risk schemes by
the independent insurers has been one of the main reasons for the
growth of these companies. This experimentation in various types of
coverages and classifications is encouraged by the Ohio Department of
Insurance. The Ohio statutory scheme permits the insurers a high de-
gree of flexibility in meeting the changing conditions of the market and
in utilizing newly acquired data because a filing becomes automatically
effective fifteen days after submission.
These facts clearly demonstrate that the competitive situation in
Ohio provides a workable and a viable means of obtaining the basic ob-
jectives of insurance.
Conclusions
If competition is able to function, as in the case of automobile li-
ability insurance in Ohio, the entire basis of government regulation of
the business of insurance and the possible application of the federal
antitrust laws to the business of insurance deserve to be re-examined.
It is not the basis of this analysis to challenge the basis of government
regulation or the applicability of the federal antitrust laws. Our object
is to show that active state regulation is not the only means by which
the social goals of insurance may be attained. This analysis also should
raise the important question of what makes the business of insurance so
different from other businesses that a special set of laws has been enacted
to govern the conduct of the business of insurance. Regardless of the
many interesting and complex problems suggested, the Ohio experience
with rate regulation by competition demonstrates an effective alternative
to active government control of insurance rates.
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